RICHARD FINLAY

When the growth of the home rule movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s is charted, civic nationalism tends to be cited as the key factor. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the phenomenon was the "sermon on the Mound" speech by Margaret Thatcher to the Church of Scotland General Assembly in 1988.

The hope that Presbyterian Scotland and the land of Adam Smith would approve her call for more robust individualism, greater independence from the state and more support for individual enterprise was, to say the least, misguided. The audience listened in stony silence and, at the end, the Moderator presented the Prime Minister with reports from the Church that highlighted the divisive nature of her policies.

In many ways, the event came to symbolise all that was wrong with Thatcherism in Scotland. For many, it was a telling metaphor for how the Prime Minister misread not only her audience but the nation as a whole. The fact that the Kirk, that most traditional bastion of Scottish society, had cold-shouldered the Iron Lady was taken as proof that her policies were alien even to traditional Scottish society.

In July 1988, the Scottish Constitutional Convention published its Claim of Right. An important component in the case that civic society was a key aspect in the demand for Scottish home rule was the fact that the convention was cross-party and included representatives from the Scottish churches, trades unions and other civic groups. Crudely put, it is argued that the Scots rejected Thatcherism on account of this strong civic identity, which needed a parliament to best represent the wishes of the Scottish people.

Yet the convention was designed to preserve the Union. While anti-Thatcherite in rhetoric, it was equally anti-Scottish-nationalist in its political objectives. In a world of diminishing political opportunities and widespread popular discontent at the political impotence of the majority of Scottish MPs, the convention was also a vehicle for political survival for the non-Conservative Unionist parties that might become polarised between take-it-or-leave-it Unionism as espoused by the Tories and independence-or-nothing nationalism as espoused by the SNP.

The advocates of home rule were able to take the mounting evidence of unhappiness with government policies and mould it into an image of national discontent. A crucial propaganda push to the home-rule cause was to use the message of the nation united in opposition to government policies. The main criticism of the Thatcher government was that its policies damaged the fabric of civil society, and a key reason why the Scots rejected the Tories was their desire to protect civic society. Yet how strong was civic society at the grass roots? How far it stretched into the masses is another question. The Scots were not averse to taking advantage of Tory policies such as the right to buy and share ownership. Individualism and consumerism were just as widespread as elsewhere. Furthermore, the gulf between "haves" and "have-nots" was growing as large "sink estates" began to emerge.

Traditional family and communal ties often began to disintegrate with the development of new private housing estates and the growth in divorce and the rise of single-parent families. What the proponents of civil society as a bastion of anti-Thatcherism nicely fudge is the extent to which it was a cause, rather than a consequence. Civil society was an aspiration rather than a reality.

Home rule climbed up the political agenda as much on account of its expedient value (as a cohesive glue for the anti-Thatcher forces) as on its own merits. The idea of a distinctive Scottish political identity that opposed Thatcherism and was founded on the altruistic notions of community and public service, rather than individualism and greed, was a convenient way of masking the fact that numerous elements within Scottish society were in decline and losing social and political relevance. In a world of growing uncertainties, the prospect of a self-governing parliament within the UK was probably a safer bet than unbridled Thatcherism.

A key problem facing the convention (given its Unionist basis) was the extent to which it would feed nationalist aspirations. The convention had to tread a careful line by using the language of Scottish distinctiveness but at the same time not providing succour to the nationalists. In many ways, the reason why the Conservative Party became a political pariah in Scotland was its inability to deal with the "national" dimension here, coupled with the negative impact of restructuring the economy, which was not going to win it any thanks. It proved a devastating cocktail. The Conservatives were blamed for administering the medicine that, in retrospect, all agreed was necessary. At the same time, they allowed their political opponents to portray them as anti-Scottish. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Scottish Conservatives and their leader were largely the authors of their own misfortunes in Scotland.

In spite of the impact of industrial closure, the Lady was definitely not for turning. Even following the General Election of 1987, which resulted in the Conservatives winning only a handful of seats in Scotland, there was still a refusal to accept that government economic policy had had an adverse effect on the outcome. The official Conservative line was that the real success stories were not being promoted enough. Devolution, it was claimed, was not an urgent matter. This hardline attitude on the economy was an important factor in the portrayal of the Conservatives as uncaring and insensitive to the needs of Scotland.

The problem for the Conservative Party was its refusal to accept that its policies were taking a toll in Scotland. This dogmatic approach was arguably a critical factor in hardening attitudes. The refusal to temper the harsh realities of market forces, coupled with a near contempt for the system of economic management that had served Scottish society, if not the economy, well in the post-war era, made the Tories vulnerable to claims they were anti-Scottish. While the opposition after 1987 made great play of the negative consequences of Thatcherite economic policy in a Scottish context, the Tories were never able to construct a positive Scottish counter-argument. There was even an element of cockiness following the 1987 defeat: "I am sometimes told the Scots don't like Thatcherism. Well, I find that hard to believe - because the Scots invented Thatcherism, long before I was thought of." This was political condescension at its worst.

Thatcher was a dyed-in-the-wool Unionist. In Scotland, the Union was sacrosanct and not up for discussion. With as much dogmatic certainty, Thatcher refused to concede that there was a "national" dimension to Scottish politics and believed the issue was simply between unionism and nationalism. She accused devolutionists of seeking "separation by degrees" and said they wanted to "tear the kingdom apart". It is quite remarkable the degree to which the Conservative Party refused to engage with the issue. The party of the Union could come up with no better defence than it was "necessary" to ensure English subsidies. This lack of imagination contrasted unfavourably with their devolutionist and nationalist opponents.

The unapologetic attitude towards economic restructuring and the uncompromising position on the existing constitutional arrangement effectively painted the Tories into a corner. Labour and the Alliance/Liberal Democrats were both more adaptable. They were able to embrace the "social market" once Thatcher had taken the opprobrium for its consequences - and, by using constitutional change, were able to mask their political impotence. The nationalists simply waited for their opportunity. By the time of John Major's premiership, the damage had been caused. The decision to host the European Union summit in Edinburgh and return the Stone of Destiny were largely empty symbolic gestures. In many ways it was an almost belated recognition that Scotland was different. However, the Tories had no answer to the question of how to accommodate that difference. "Scottishness" was hijacked by the opposition.