IT was always unrealistic to imagine that the British garrison bunkered down on the outskirts of Basra could be reduced much below its current level of 4000 soldiers. It needs more than 3500 simply for "force protection", being able to mount a credible defence of its own personnel within the perimeter of the airfield complex that has become their fortified home. Prime Minister Gordon Brown was being disingenuous at best when he announced a potential spring drawdown last October. At the time, he was contemplating a snap election.

The prospect of bringing some of our boys home was intended to play well with British voters increasingly disillusioned with Iraq and the steady drip of casualties for no apparent purpose. Senior commanders, however, had already made it known to Downing Street that any withdrawal would have to be limited and contingent on an improving security situation. That gave the premier his escape clause, an option reinforced last week by the abject failure of the Iraqi government forces to tame Mehdi Army militiamen in Iraq's southern oil capital.

Five days of fighting left renegade cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's men neither dislodged nor disarmed, and the Iraqi forces in control of little beyond their own bases in the city centre. Their headquarters had to be resupplied using part of a UK armoured battlegroup, as was revealed by Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, in the Commons yesterday. Having food and water delivered by a foreign army's tanks is not a usual indicator of battlefield success. In anyone's terms, the surprise offensive meant to demonstrate Baghdad's capability of standing on its own military feet ended in humiliation and unplanned ceasefire. Mr Brown can now claim that he had never promised to bring up to 1500 soldiers home. His bet had always been carefully hedged so that the top brass would take responsibility in the event that his optimistic and possibly cynical announcement failed to materialise.

However, the Prime Minister and Mr Browne, who was left to renege on the drawdown yesterday, inherit other problems as a result. An under-strength British Army is already fighting two extended counter-insurgency campaigns on a shoestring peace-time budget. Reducing the commitment to Iraq, or announcing a complete withdrawal, would have been the only means of creating an operational reserve manpower pool for Afghanistan, where 7800 troops, including half of the Royal Regiment of Scotland, are about to face the Taliban in a make-or-break spring offensive. There is also the problem of morale among front-line soldiers in Iraq, who were led to believe they might be coming home early.

The men and women of 7 Brigade, the Desert Rats, were hoping they might not have to deploy en masse to Basra in a few weeks to replace them. Both groups have arguably become victims of political opportunism. They deserve better.